How to Identify Scientifc Revolutions? by Weber, Erik & Seselja, Dunja
1How to Identify Scientific Revolutions?
Erik Weber and Dunja Šešelja
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University
{Erik.Weber, Dunja.Seselja}@UGent.be
Abstract
Conceptualizing  scientific  revolutions  by  means  of  explicating  their  causes,  their  underlying 
structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn's philosophy of science and belongs 
to its  legacy.  In this  paper we show that such “explanatory concepts” of revolutions should be 
distinguished from a concept based on the identification criteria of scientific revolutions. The aim 
of this paper is to offer such a concept, and to show that it  can be fruitfully used for a further 
elaboration of the explanatory conceptions of revolutions. On the one hand, our concept can be 
used to test the preciseness and accuracy of these conceptions, by examining to what extent their 
criteria fit revolutions as they are defined by our concept. On the other hand, our concept can serve 
as the basis on which these conceptions can be further specified. We will present four different 
explanatory concepts of revolutions – Kuhn's, Thagard's, Chen's and Barker's, and Laudan's – and 
point to the ways in which each of them can be further specified in view of our concept.
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1. Introduction
Conceptualising  scientific  revolutions  has  been  one  of  the  central  issues  in  the  explication  of 
scientific development in general.  This topic was especially emphasised in Thomas Kuhn's  The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. What Kuhn, as well as his successors (e.g. Larry Laudan, Paul 
Thagard  etc.)  tried  to  do  is  to  offer  an  account  of  revolutions  which  explicates  the  structure 
underlying this process: the ways in which revolutions emerge and the changes they provoke on 
epistemological, methodological and ontological level. In contrast to such approaches, revolutions 
can also be analysed in terms of identification criteria. Let us clarify this difference by making an 
analogy with a medical diagnosis.
A disease  can  be  specified  in  two  ways.  One  way  is  to  give  a  full  explanation  of  the 
physiological  processes  constituting  the  illness.  This  is  an  account  that  would  be  useful  for  a 
biomedical researcher who wants to produces knowledge that is useful for prevention and cure. 
Knowing how the disease emerges and develops is useful background knowledge in such research. 
On the other hand, a doctor diagnosing a patient will rather refer to symptoms as the identification 
criteria  of  a  disease.  The  full  account  of  the  disease  process  is  irrelevant  in  the  process  of 
diagnosing  as  such.  The  biomedical  researcher  will  need  both  approaches:  if  she  runs  clinical 
experiments, she will also need symptoms as identification criteria, in order to design and interpret 
her experiments.1
Going back to the case of scientific revolutions, the above mentioned attempts at characterizing 
revolutions are comparable to a full  account of a disease process. A concept based on a set of 
identification criteria of revolutions – similar to a set of symptoms used for  identification of a 
disease – is missing in the literature.2 The aim of this paper is to offer such a concept. What we are 
after is a set of identification criteria, which captures the meaning of the term “scientific revolution” 
as it is used by scientists, historians and laypersons. In other words, there should be a substantial 
overlap with an intuitive usage of this term. In a broader context, our concept should also serve as a 
normative guideline in disambiguating and correcting the usage of the term by e.g. laypersons. We 
will show that such a concept can be fruitfully used not only as a tool for identifying revolutions, 
2but for a further  elaboration of already existing conceptions.  To this  end,  we will  discuss four 
approaches to conceptualising revolutions, given by Thomas Kuhn, Paul Thagard, Xiang Chen and 
Peter Barker, and by Larry Laudan.
2. How to identify scientific revolutions?
2.1. Let  us  first  clarify  how  we  are  going  to  use  certain  concepts.  A  paradigm is  a  couple 
<{C1,  ...  ,Cn},{P1,  ...  ,Pn}>  of  a  set  of  constraints  and  a  set  of  cognitive  problems  (research 
questions). The latter constitute the intended domain of application of the constraints. An adherent  
of a paradigm <{C1, ... ,Cn},{P1, ... ,Pn}> is someone who believes that all problems in {P1, ... ,Pn} 
must be solved by using the constraints {C1, ... ,Cn}. A school is a group of scientists who adhere to 
the same paradigm.
To  clarify  these  definitions,  consider  a  scientist  who  wants  to  construct  a  theory  which 
accurately predicts the motion of material objects on inclined planes:
Cognitive problem
Predicting motion of material objects on inclined planes.
Let us assume that our scientist is an adherent of the Newtonian paradigm. This means that he is 
convinced that all kinematic problems (not only inclined planes, but e.g. also the motion of free 
falling bodies or of objects falling in a liquid and suspended to strings), must be solved by assuming 
that Newton's three laws of motion, his law of universal gravitation and his principle of vector 
addition of forces are correct. If we restrict ourselves to inclined planes, these general principles 
result in the following constraints:
Constraint 1
Any material object on an inclined plane satisfies the law F=m·dv/dt.
Constraint 2
Any material object on an inclined plane is subject to FZ, the gravitational force of the earth 
which is directed towards the centre of the earth and has magnitude Z=m·g.
Constraint 3
If two or more forces act on the same material object, the resultant force F can be calculated 
by vector addition.
Because of these constraints, the initial cognitive problem is transformed into a set of more specific 
research questions:
Derived research questions
Which other forces influence the motion of material objects on inclined planes?
What are the characteristics (direction, magnitude) of these forces?
The example illustrates how paradigms work: the constraints transform the general initial cognitive 
problem into a set of specific research questions.
2.2. Let us now present our concept of scientific revolution. First of all, the identification criteria of 
scientific revolutions should be capable of distinguishing revolutions (or revolutionary paradigm 
shifts) from gradual paradigm shifts. The way we want to draw this distinction is actually quite 
simple and draws on an analogy between sciences and industrial equipment. An entrepreneur owing 
a factory can change his production in different ways. He can e.g. expand his factory and fill the 
extra space with new machines. Or he can throw all his machinery and replace it completely with 
new ones. Scientific revolutions, as we define them, are analogous to such a complete retooling. 
3This is our definition:
A revolution occurs if  and only if  a  substantial  group of researchers within a scientific 
discipline (i) shifts to a new paradigm which is such that a large majority of the auxiliary 
hypotheses of the old paradigm becomes pointless for theory building, and (ii) this group of 
scientists keeps on working with the new paradigm for a certain period of time.
Note that  this  definition contains some vague expressions,  marked in italics.  However,  making 
these expressions more precise would be arbitrary, so we think that this set of identification criteria 
is “as precise as it gets”.
In order to understand this definition,  it  is  important to know what we mean with auxiliary 
hypotheses.  Copernicus  was  working  with  deferents  and  epicycles,  just  like  the  geocentrists. 
However, he could not recuperate their assumptions about radii and angular speeds, because they 
were pointless to him: they belong to constructions around the Earth rather than around the Sun. He 
needed brand new assumptions about radii and angular speeds. This is in sharp contrast with the 
paradigm  shifts  within  a  geocentric  theory:  Hipparchus  could  recuperate  the  assumptions  of 
Apollonius about the radii of the circles and the angular speeds of the planets and imaginary centres 
of  the  epicycles  (for  a  more  detailed  description  of  this  example  see  Section  6.).  In  general, 
auxiliary hypotheses are the answers that are given to derived research questions within a paradigm 
(cp. Section 2.1.).
2.3. We have to establish the similarity of our concept with the intuitive use of the term. Wray 2003 
contains a table of 28 scientific developments which are usually called revolutions (p. 141-142). He 
uses the table to test claims about the relation between age and significant discoveries. We will use 
it to discuss the similarity of our concept with the customary use of the term. Let us start right away 
with a prima facie problem. Our concept presupposes that there is a new paradigm which replaces 
an old one. This excludes cases in which an initial breakthrough is made in a field. The following 
significant scientific developments from Wray's list are not revolutions according to our definition, 
because there was no pre-existing alternative:
Newton Theory of Light and Colour  
Musschenbroek / Kleist Leyden Jar
Franklin Theory  of  Electrical  Phenomena
Dalton Chemical Atomic Theory
Ohm Ohm's Law
Clausius/Kelvin Thermodynamics
Darwin Evolution by Natural Selection
Röntgen X-rays
One can disagree about specific items in this list, but the idea is clear: initial breakthroughs are 
often called revolutions (cfr. also the so-called “axiomatic revolution” in mathematics, which refers 
to the first attempts to axiomatise set theory and arithmetic). These items can be opposed to cases in 
Wray's list where a pre-existing alternative was present:
Newton Newtonian Mechanics Aristotelian Mechanics
Copernicus Heliocentric Astronomy Geocentric Astronomy
Kepler Elliptical Orbits Circular Orbits
Einstein Relativity Theory Newtonian Mechanics
Bohr Bohr's Atom Thomson's Atom
4The Keynesian revolution in economics, which is not in Wray's table, could be added to this list; so 
could the revolution in the earth sciences launched by Alfred Wegener (continental drift).  
There are two ways to deal with this problem. The first is to invent different names for the two 
types, e.g. “domain revolution” for the first (because there is a sudden and significant change in the 
domain,  but  no  dominant  paradigm  or  research  tradition  that  is  overthrown)  and  “paradigm 
revolution” for the second type (because there is a switch from one paradigm to another).  The 
second option is  to  preserve the term revolution for  the second type (as  we have done in  our 
definition in Section 2.2.) and invent a new term for cases of the first type, e.g. “paradigm-creating 
change” (a term used in Wray 2007).
There are no fundamental objections against the first option, but we think the second one is a bit 
handier.  Revolutions  in  the  strict  sense  pose  all  kinds  of  challenges  to  the  scientists  that  are 
involved  (rational  pursuit,  theory  choice)  which  are  absent  in  episodes  of  paradigm-creating 
change. So there are a lot of problems in epistemology and philosophy of science that only relate to 
revolutions in a strict sense.
The identification  criteria  incorporated  in  our  concept  focus  mainly  on  the  difference  between 
revolutionary and non-revolutionary changes. In contrast to conceptions of revolutions aimed at 
presenting the inner structure of a revolutionary change, our concept does not refer to the causes, 
circumstances, results, implications, etc. of revolutions. This is what makes it fruitful: it can be used 
to  frame  hypotheses  about  the  differences  (in  causes,  circumstances,  results,  implications  ...) 
between  revolutions  and  other  scientific  developments,  important  for  the  former  approach  to 
conceptualising revolutions. Let us then have a look at  four different accounts of revolutionary 
change. We will argue that, in spite of offering important insights into the dynamics of the scientific 
development, each of them can be further elaborated by means of our concept.
3. Kuhn's Conceptualization of Scientific Revolutions
Distinction between normal science as a cumulative growth of knowledge and scientific revolutions 
as a non-cumulative growth of knowledge constitutes the main idea underlying Kuhn's conception 
of revolutions,  or at  least  its  negative part.  The positive part  is  given in  view of two notions: 
incommensurability and  world(-view)  change  (cp.  Hoyningen-Huene  1993,  p.  197).  The  entire 
Kuhnian  project  of  conceptualizing  scientific  revolutions  could  be  described  as  an  attempt  at 
specifying these two notions in an ever more concrete way. As a result, Kuhn's later criteria of 
revolutionary  change  seem  to  allow  for  a  more  restrictive  notion  than  the  one  given  in  The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (henceforth TSSR). Let us first present the main features of his 
early conception.
3.1. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: extended concept of revolutions
The basic definition presented in TSSR is the following one:
Scientific  revolutions  are here taken to  be those non-cumulative developmental  episodes  in which an older 
paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one ... (1962, p. 92)3
Comparing scientific revolutions with political ones, Kuhn writes:
In much the same way, scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a 
narrow subdivision of the scientific community, that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in 
the exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way. In both political 
and scientific development the sense of malfunction that can lead to a crisis is prerequisite to revolution. (p. 92)
Kuhn calls this the genetic aspect of the parallel between scientific and political revolutions. In his 
5view, there is also a second aspect to that parallel:
Like the choice between competing political  institutions, that  between competing paradigms proves to be a 
choice between incompatible modes of community life (p. 94).
In which way do different paradigms resemble incompatible modes of community life? Here the 
concept of incommensurability enters Kuhn's account of revolutions. In the introduction of  TSSR 
Kuhn writes that each scientific revolution
... necessitated the community's rejection of one time-honoured scientific theory in favour of another incompatible 
with it. Each produced a consequent shift in problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards by which 
the profession determined what should count as an admissible problem or as a legitimate problem-solution. And 
each transformed the scientific imagination in ways that we shall ultimately need to describe as transformation of 
the world within which scientific work was done. (Kuhn 1962, p. 6)
 
This  preliminary  characterisation  of  revolutions  captures  some  of  the  main  aspects  of 
incommensurability and world-change, as they are presented in  TSSR.  Incommensurability – or a 
lack of common measure – is a relation which holds between pre- and post-revolutionary normal 
scientific  practices,  and  it  includes  the  following  three  aspects  (cp.  Kuhn  1962,  p.  148-150; 
Hoyningen-Huene 1993, p. 208-212). First, the problems which are to be addressed by scientific 
research, as well as the standards for what counts as an acceptable problem-solution are not the 
same before and after a revolution. Second, there is a conceptual change or a meaning change, 
which  can  be  extensional  (when an  object  moves  from the  extension  of  one  concept  into  the 
extension of another)  or intensional  (when the attributes of objects  which fall  under a concept 
change). Finally, ‘the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds’ 
(cp.  Kuhn  1962,  p.  150).  The  world4 can  change  in  one  of  the  following  ways:  first,  by  an 
introduction of phenomena and entities which did not belong to the earlier world and which cause a 
revision of implicit or explicit theoretical assumptions (this class consists of unexpected discoveries 
such as is discovery of X-rays, cp.  Ibid.,  p. 58); second, by a transformation in which familiar 
objects are seen in different light, which requires an abandonment of some of their old attributes 
(e.g. the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics, cp. Ibid., p. 102); third, a change of 
certain quantitative data may change the relevant quantitative expectations or introduce some new 
ones (e.g. changes introduced by Dalton's work in chemistry, cp. Ibid., p. 130-135).
There is indeed much more that could be said about Kuhn's concepts of incommensurability and 
world change. However, for the purposes of this paper it suffices to notice that they allow for a 
quite broad idea of scientific revolution. The concept presented in TSSR is an extended one when 
compared to the intuitive use of this term: 
The extended  conception of  the  nature  of  scientific  revolution is  the  one  delineated  in  the  pages  that  follow. 
Admittedly the extension strains customary usage. Nevertheless, I shall continue to speak even of discoveries as 
revolutionary, because it is just the possibility of relating their structure to that of, say, the Copernican revolution 
that makes the extended conception seem to me so important (p. 7-8).
The extended concept of revolution encompasses three classes of changes in scientific development 
(cp. Hoyningen-Huene 1993, p. 197-198). The first one includes the major shifts in scientific theory 
and practice, typical for the popular usage of the term (e.g. Newton's or Einstein's revolutions in 
physics). The second class consists of changes which have the same sorts of consequences within 
the relevant discipline like the first class, even though their effects might not be noticeable outside 
science or outside the discipline (e.g.  wave-propagation theory of light or Maxwell's  theory of 
electromagnetism).  The  third  class  consists  of  unexpected  discoveries  of  new  phenomena  or 
entities, which bring corrections of previous scientific theory and practice (e.g. a discovery of X-
rays).5
On the  basis  of  this  brief  overview of  Kuhn's  account, we can  notice  that  Kuhn offers  no 
identification criteria of revolutions that would correspond to the intuitive use of this term. Clearly, 
6our concept can be used for a further elaboration of Kuhn's conception. Using our concept we can 
ask, for example, if it is possible to further specify the type of incommensurability characterizing 
revolutions in our restricted sense, and whether it differs from incommensurability in other types of 
scientific  developments.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  according  to  some  interpreters,  Kuhn's  later 
specification of the notion of incommensurability allows for the notion of revolution that is more 
similar to the popular term. Let us then present Kuhn's later criteria.
3.2. Revolutions as taxonomic changes
3.2.1. In  the  course  of  his  later  work,  Kuhn  turned  towards  linguistic  aspects  of  scientific 
developments, specifying the notion of revolution in terms of taxonomic changes. In Kuhn 1987 
scientific revolutions are presented as sharing the following key properties:
(1) Revolutionary changes  are  holistic:  in  contrast  to  cumulative changes  where a  single 
generalization can be added or revised, ‘in revolutionary change one must either live with 
incoherence  or  else  revise  a  number  of  inter-related  generalizations  together.’ (Kuhn 
1987, p. 29). This holistic character of revolutionary changes derives from a specific type 
of meaning change, which is Kuhn's next criterion.
(2) Revolutions are characterised by a  meaning change – a change in the way words and 
phrases attach to nature, i.e. a change in the way their referents are determined. Since this 
criterion is too broad, the following one serves as its specification.
(3) Revolutionary changes alter not only the criteria by which terms attach to nature but also 
the set of objects or situations to which those terms attach. In other words, the meaning 
change has to be such that it induces a world-change.
These key properties are summarized in the following quote:
What characterizes revolutions is,  thus, change in several  of the taxonomic categories prerequisite to scientific 
descriptions  and  generalizations.  That  change,  furthermore,  is  an  adjustment  not  only  of  criteria  relevant  to 
categorization,  but  also  of  the  way  in  which  given  objects  and  situations  are  distributed  among  preexisting 
categories.  Since  such  redistribution  always  involves  more  than  one  category  and  since  those  categories  are 
interdefined, this sort of alteration is necessarily holistic. (Kuhn 1987, p. 30)6
Furthermore, in his (1991) Kuhn restricted taxonomic changes relevant for scientific revolutions to 
the class of kind terms:
Terms of this sort have two essential properties. First, ... they are marked or labeled as kind terms by virtue of 
lexical characteristics like taking the indefinite article. Being a kind term is thus part of what the word means, part 
of what one must have in head to use the word properly. Second – a limitation I sometimes refer to as the no-
overlap principle – no two kind terms, no two terms with the kind label, may overlap in their referents unless they 
are related as species to genus. There are no dogs that are also cats ... Therefore, if the members of a language 
community encounter a dog that's also a cat (or more realistically, a creature like a duck-billed platypus), they 
cannot just enrich the set of category terms but must instead redesign a part of the taxonomy. (p. 92)
The main  ingredient  of  Kuhn's  later  account  are  thus  changes  in  the  taxonomy of  kind  terms 
specific for the scientific discipline in question. In contrast to the account of incommensurability 
given in TSSR, taxonomic change is not anymore just one aspect of incommensurability, but it has 
become  its  crucial  property.  This  shift  derives  from  Kuhn's  explication  of  the  notion  of 
incommensurability in terms of translatability.  Namely,  in the context of scientific theories “no 
common measure” receives the meaning of “no common language”: 
The claim that two theories are incommensurable is then the claim that there is no language, neutral or otherwise, 
into which both theories, conceived as sets of sentences, can be translated without residue or loss. (Kuhn 1983, p. 
36)
Characterized in this way, incommensurability does not require that languages of two competing 
7paradigms differ in all of the concepts. In most cases incommensurability is local, which means that 
‘Only for a small subgroup of (usually interdefined) terms and for sentences containing them do 
problems of translatability arise.’ (Kuhn 1983, p. 36) Moreover, incommensurability and world-
change occur only when the structure of the lexicon, consisting of the relations between empirical 
concepts of a discipline,  changes (cp.  Kuhn 1983, p. 52; Hoyningen-Huene 1993, p.  217-218). 
Clarifying the difference between his early and later approach Kuhn writes:
In Structure [TSSR] it [the distinction between normal and revolutionary development] was the distinction between 
those developments that simply add to knowledge, and those which require giving up part of what's been believed 
before. In the new book it will emerge as the distinction between developments which do and developments which 
do not require local taxonomic change. (The alteration permits a significantly more nuanced description of what 
goes on during revolutionary change than I've been able to provide before.) (Kuhn 1991, p. 97)7
Interestingly, Kuhn sometimes makes a difference between the concept of revolution based on its 
identification  criteria  and  his  broader,  explanatory  concept.  In  his  article  What  are  Scientific  
Revolutions? (Kuhn  1987)  Kuhn  gives  several  examples  of  revolutions,  and  discusses 
characteristics which they all share. Before presenting the examples he writes:
Before turning to a first extended example, let me try – for those not previously familiar with my vocabulary – to 
suggest what it is an example of. Revolutionary change is defined in part by its difference from normal change, and 
normal  change is  ...  the sort  that  results  in growth,  accretion, cumulative addition to  what was known before. 
Scientific laws, for example, are usually products of this normal process: Boyle's law will illustrate what is involved. 
Its discoverers had previously possessed the concepts of gas pressure and volume as well as the instruments required 
to determine their magnitudes.  … Revolutionary changes are different  and far more problematic.  They involve 
discoveries that cannot be accommodated within the concepts in use before they were made. (p. 14) 
Kuhn  here  obviously  makes  an  attempt  at  offering  the  identification  criteria  of  scientific 
revolutions.  Nevertheless,  these  criteria  are  not  very  precise  since  the  distinction  between 
cumulative and non-cumulative changes is not sufficiently explicated. Moreover the explication of 
this  distinction necessarily  requires  Kuhn's  broader  analysis  of  revolutions.  In  other  words,  his 
identification  criteria  cannot  stand  on  their  own:  their  full  understanding  requires  Kuhn's 
explanatory concept of revolution. Such broadly construed identification criteria could of course be 
accurate,  but their  complexity makes them less handy than the criteria offered by our concept. 
Moreover, the overlap between the concept of revolution captured in Kuhn's later writings and the 
intuitive usage of the term is not completely clear. On the one hand, Kuhn never explicitly said that 
his later concept is more restrictive than the one in TSSR (cp. Wray 2007, p. 64). On the other hand, 
according to some interpreters, his later conception allows for this restriction. By comparing his 
criteria to our concept, we could obtain an answer to this question. In contrast, without specifying 
the identification criteria of revolutions, an analysis of late Kuhn's notion and its similarity to the 
popular term remains imprecise. Let us clarify this on the example of Wray's interpretation.
3.2.2. Taking into  account  Kuhn's  later  explication  of  the  notion  of  incommensurability,  Brad 
Wray (2007) suggests that the necessary and sufficient conditions for Kuhnian revolutions can be 
summarized in the following way:
For a scientific revolution to occur, (i) a research community must make a taxonomic change, (ii) the change must 
undermine the shared standards of the research community, and (iii) there must be a widespread disappointment 
with existing practices. (Wray 2007, p. 66)
Wray shows that by requiring that a revolutionary change includes a replacement of one taxonomy 
by another incommensurable one, Kuhn implicitly narrowed down his original concept (cp. Wray 
2007, p. 67-68). For example, discovery of X-rays, which fitted Kuhn's earlier criteria as the case of 
an unexpected discovery (cp. Hoyningen-Huene 1993, p. 229), does not fit his later criteria, since it 
did not cause a replacement of the existing taxonomy with a new incommensurable one (cp. Wray 
2007, p. 68).
8It is important to notice that Wray does not offer any identification criteria of revolutions, which 
would clarify why discovery of X-rays is not to be considered as a scientific revolution (according 
to the customary use of the term). He only shows why this discovery does not fit  Kuhn's later 
criteria of revolutions, but in how far these criteria fit the popular term is shown only by means of 
several  examples,  and not by any clear  concept  of the popular  term.  The identification criteria 
incorporated in our concept can be of help here. For example, in view of our concept, it is easy to 
see why the discovery of X-rays was not a scientific revolution: it did not induce a rejection of the 
majority of then accepted auxiliary hypotheses (cp. Section 2.2).
Moreover, our concept can be used to test the accuracy of Kuhn's criteria as Wray's conceives 
them. For example, on the basis of it we can show that the requirement for a crisis might not be 
satisfied by all  historical  cases.8 Let us have a look at  the example of the recent revolution in 
geological sciences. 
The revolution in geology, which was initiated by Wegener's hypothesis of the continental drift 
and concluded by the general acceptance of the theory of plate tectonics was not preceded by a 
crisis, which is in Wray's interpretation, one of the necessary and sufficient conditions of Kuhnian 
revolutions. The reason for this lies in the specific state of geological sciences before the revolution. 
Before the theory of plate tectonics geology did not have the usual properties of Kuhnian normal 
science. It was divided in sub-disciplines (such as seismology, experimental petrology, structural 
geology, oceanography), each of which had its own set of problems and methods for addressing 
them. The only common element of all these approaches was the assumption of stable continents, 
which itself was too less to unite them under the same framework of the normal scientific research 
in Kuhnian sense of the term (cp. Stewart 1990, p. 138-139; Hallam 1973, p. 107-108). However, it 
would be equally wrong to characterize such a state as a pre-paradigm state of science, since each 
of these disciplines alone did have the properties of normal science. We could rather describe it, 
together with John A. Stewart,  as a  multi-paradigm state of science (cp. Stewart 1990, p. 139). 
Stewart here calls upon Margaret Masterman's point that ‘multi-paradigm science is full science, on 
Kuhn's own criteria, by the proviso that these criteria have to be applied by treating each sub-field 
as a separate field’ (Masterman 1970, p. 74). In such a situation the assumption of fixed continents, 
although common to most geologists, did not have serious implications for the oceanographic data, 
which  brought  the  key  evidence  for  the  plate  tectonics  hypothesis.  Even  when  there  were 
expectations regarding this data, it was easy to modify supporting assumptions in order to get the 
right match (Stewart 1990, p. 142). Therefore, there was no real crisis, but instead, there was a 
growing awareness that the new theory could serve as the general framework for all geological 
disciplines. Nevertheless, the majority of auxiliary hypotheses constituting the “fixist” framework 
had to be rejected and replaced by the new theory of plate tectonics, which means this shift was 
indeed revolutionary according to our concept.
4. Thagard's conceptual revolutions
Following Kuhn's taxonomic approach to conceptualizing revolutions, Thagard (1992) offered an 
account  which  links  scientific  revolutions  to  revisions  of  ontology,  characterised  in  terms  of 
conceptual systems. Let us first explicate the notion of a conceptual system as it is used in this 
context.
Conceptual systems can be analysed as networks of concepts which stand in certain relations. 
These relations include (cp. Thagard 1992, p. 30-31):
(1) Kind links, which indicate that one concept is a kind of another. For example, black is a kind 
of colour, a reptile is a kind of animal.
(2) Instance links,  which indicate that  the object represented by a concept is an instance of 
another concept. For example, Tweety is a bird, Tweety is a canary.
(3) Rule links, which express general (but not always universal) relations among concepts. For 
9example, canaries have the colour yellow.
(4) Property  links,  which  indicate  that  the  object  represented  by  a  concept  has  a  property 
captured by another concept. For example, Tweety is yellow.
(5) Part links, which indicate that a whole has a given part. For example, A beak is a part of a 
bird.
In view of such a representation of conceptual systems, Thagard suggests that ontologies can be 
specified in terms of kind and part links.
Why  are  kind-relations  and  part-relations  so  fundamental  to  our  conceptual  systems?  In  addition  to  the 
organizing power of the hierarchies they form, these two sets of relations are important because they specify the 
constituents  of  the  world.  Ontology is  the  branch  of  philosophy  (and  cognitive  science!)  that  asks  what 
fundamentally exists, and ontological questions usually concern what kinds of things exist. Moreover, given an 
account  of  the  kind  of  things  there  are,  which  translates  immediately  into  a  hierarchical  organization,  we 
naturally  want  to  ask:  of  what  are  the  objects  of  these  kinds  made?  The answer  to  this  question  requires 
consideration of their parts, generating the part-hierarchy that also organizes our concepts. Thus the major role 
that  kind-hierarchies  and  part-hierarchies  play  in  our  conceptual  systems  is  not  accidental,  but  reflects 
fundamental ontological questions. (Thagard 1992, p. 32-33; italics in original)
Even though Thagard does not speak of instance links at this place, we find them equally important 
for the specification of ontology he is after. For example, without instance links it would be difficult 
to show the difference between the ontologies underlying geocentric and heliocentric standpoints, 
since the assumption that the Sun is an instance of a planet is a link present in the former but not in 
the latter conceptual system.
Let us now look at the various ways in which ontologies can change (cp. Thagard 1992, p. 34-
36). If a new ontology is formulated, it may happen that links are added but no links are deleted. In 
this  case,  the  new  ontology  is  an  extension  of  the  old  one.  Three  “pure”  subtypes  can  be 
distinguished here (mixtures of these types are also extensions). The first subtype is what Thagard 
calls  decomposition.  The ontologies of Bohr and Heisenberg constitute a good example.  Bohr's 
ontology can be characterised as follows:
Atoms consist of a nucleus and one or more electrons.
Nuclei and electrons are indivisible wholes.
Heisenberg dismisses the last claim and replaces it with:
Electrons are indivisible wholes.
Nuclei consist of protons and neutrons.
Protons and neutrons are indivisible wholes.
Two concepts and two part links are added, and no part link (or other link) is removed.
The two other pure types which Thagard distinguishes are  coalescence and  differentiation. In the 
first, a superordinate concept is added to group two concepts previously thought to be unrelated. 
Kind  links  are  added  between  the  existing  concepts  and  the  new  one.  For  instance,  one  can 
introduce the concept of living being to group animals and plants. Differentiation works the other 
way around: subordinate kinds are distinguished.
If at least one link is deleted and replaced with another one, the ontology is revised, not merely 
extended. We discuss some important subtypes. The first one is what Thagard calls collapse. This is 
the reverse of differentiation: concepts falling under the same superordinate concept disappear. For 
instance, Newton abandoned the Aristotelian distinctions between terrestrial and celestial bodies, 
and between natural and unnatural motions. It is obvious that a collapse entails that kind links are 
deleted.
In the second subtype, no concepts are deleted: the existing concepts are reorganized. In the 
Darwinian revolution, kind links were reorganised. Before Darwin, there were three kinds of living 
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creatures: human, animal and plant. After Darwin humans cease to be a separate category: they are 
kinds of primates, primates are kinds of mammals and mammals are kinds of animals. Thagard calls 
this  branch jumping, because concepts move from one branch of the tree (which can be used as 
graphical representation of the conceptual system) to another branch.
Similar things can happen with part links. In Stahl's Phlogiston Theory, metals consist of calx 
and phlogiston; phlogiston and calxes are elements. According to Lavoisier, calxes consist of metal 
and oxygen; metals and oxygen are elements. What we have here is the addition of a new concept 
(oxygen, resulting in a new branch representing the decomposition of calxes), deletion of a concept 
(phlogiston, resulting in the collapse of the decomposition branch of metals) and reorganization 
(metals become parts of calxes, instead of the other way around; this is similar to branch-jumping).
Finally, instance links can be revised. For instance, the conceptual system of geocentrist and 
heliocentrist astronomers contains the following part links.
The Universe contains planets.
The Universe contains the Stellar Sphere.
The Universe contains the Sun, the Earth, the Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and 
Saturn.
The characteristic instance links accepted by the geocentrist, are:
The Sun is a planet.
The Moon is a planet.
The Earth is not a planet.
Heliocentrists introduce a new concept (satellite), so a part link is added:
The Universe contains satellites.
This addition is just an extension. The revisions occur in the instance links:
The Sun is not a planet.
The Moon is a satellite.
The Earth is a planet.
These links, accepted by the heliocentrist, contradict the geocentric ones mentioned above.
Though Thagard does not claim that all  revisions of ontology lead to revolutions, he sees a 
strong link:
Because kind-relations organize concepts in tree-like hierarchies, a very important kind of conceptual change ... 
involves moving a concept from one branch of the tree to another. Such branch jumping is common in scientific 
revolutions. (p. 36; italics on “common” added)
Belief  revision,  concept  addition,  and  simple  organization  of  conceptual  hierarchies  are  common  in  the 
development of scientific knowledge, but we shell see that branch jumping and tree switching are much rarer 
events associated with conceptual revolutions. The momentousness of a revision is affected, of course, by more 
than these conceptual relations. (p. 37; italics added)
[Scientific  revolutions]  differ  in  the  kinds  of  conceptual  change  that  they  involved,  although  all  major 
revolutions in the natural sciences include the most dramatic kinds of conceptual change: branch jumping or tree 
switching. (p. 262-263; italics added)
The first two quotes suggest that revisions belong to the typicality of scientific revolutions (where 
revisions are neither necessary nor sufficient for revolutions), while the last quote suggests that 
revisions are a necessary condition for all major revolutions. In both cases, the notion of scientific 
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revolution is not clearly identified. Moreover, the distinction between “major” and “non-major” 
revolutions, assumed in the last quote, is not at all explicated.
Our definition of revolutions can be used to explore the link between revisions and scientific 
revolutions in more detail. Consider two paradigms A and B, where B is developed to replace A. If 
the ontology of  B is a revision of  A, then it often happens that the auxiliary hypotheses of A are 
pointless for theory building from the perspective of the new paradigm. The shift from geocentric to 
heliocentric astronomy illustrates this. However, not all revisions lead to revolutions. For example, 
according to a new convention in astronomy, Pluto is not to be characterised as a planet. The kind 
link has thus been changed (an instance of  branch jumping) and a new ontology is constructed, 
without any revolutionary implications.
If  the ontology of  B is  identical  to  or  an extension of  A,  it  often happens  that  most  of  the 
auxiliary hypotheses of A can be used in theory building within the framework of paradigm B. This 
is  illustrated  by  the  successive  paradigms  within  the  geocentric  tradition.  However,  there  are 
exceptions. Kepler's introduction of elliptical orbits constitutes a scientific revolution (according to 
our definition) without revision of ontology. Heisenberg's model of the atom is another example: 
the ontology remains the same (an atom consists of a nucleus and electrons) but the hypotheses 
about  the  behaviour  of  the  atoms  are  completely  different  compared  to  Bohr's  atomic  model. 
Revolutions thus can be triggered without tinkering with the ontology of a paradigm.
5. Chen's and Barker's frame-based approach to taxonomic changes
According  to  Kuhn's  original  conception  of  revolutions,  revolutionary  changes  occur  in  a 
discontinuous manner.9 Contrary to this, Chen and Barker have argued that scientific revolutions 
often exhibit strong continuity (Chen et al., p. S209). Using methods from cognitive psychology 
they offered a model of conceptual change in order to show that ‘if concepts are represented by 
frames, the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur 
in a continuous manner’ (Chen et al. 2000, p. S209).
A frame representation used in this model consists of: a) a superordinate concept, b) two lists of 
properties  –  attributes  and  values  –  which  can  be  ascribed  to  this  concept,  and  c)  a  list  of 
subordinate concepts. All the subordinate concepts share the properties in the attribute list, while 
only  some  properties  from  the  value  list  represent  their  typical  features.  For  example,  the 
superordinate concept of fowl has five attributes: beak, neck, body, leg and foot. Each of these 
attributes has a set of ascribable values: a beak can be either rounded or pointed, a neck can be 
either short or long, etc. By choosing a round beak and short legs, we obtain typical features of the 
subordinate  concept  –  waterfowl,  while  a  pointed  beak  and  long  legs  give  us  the  subordinate 
concept – game bird (cp. Chen et al. 2000, p. S210). A frame constructed in this way is capable of 
capturing certain relations between the concepts and their typical features, namely: 
(1) Hierarchical relations between the features of a concept: some features are attributes while 
others are only values ascribable to some of the attributes and not directly to the concept 
itself.  For example, “large” is a value which can characterize the attribute “body” – one of 
the properties of the superordinate concept of fowls.
(2) Stable relations between the attributes, i.e. relations which hold across all typical exemplars 
of the superordinate concept. For example, “body” and “neck” stand in a relation which is a 
structural invariant for the class of fowls.
(3) Constraints on the relations between the values and attributes, i.e. on their variability (e.g. in 
the case of fowls, there is a constraint between the values of “leg” and “body” – long legs 
are usually associated with a large body) (cp. Chen et al. 2000, p. S210-S211). 
The main advantage of this approach to taxonomic change analysis is that it can account for the 
continuity of a change during scientific revolutions: 
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Every single classification anomaly immediately causes changes in the frame of the superordinate concept and then 
changes in the taxonomy. Both the changes of frame and those of taxonomy are continuous. ... At a certain point in 
this  piecemeal  evolution,  the  newly  formed  taxonomy  becomes  incompatible  with  the  old  one,  and  then  the 
revolutionary nature of this continuous change becomes recognizable. (Chen et al. 2000, p. S216)
In spite of the advantages of Chen's and Barker's model, we may notice that it offers no clear 
criteria  for  distinguishing  between  scientific  revolutions  and  smaller  changes  in  scientific 
development. In other words, it  does not answer the question: at which point in this piecemeal 
evolution  the  change  becomes  revolutionary?  As  the  authors  (together  with  Hanne  Andersen) 
clarify in another paper discussing the same model:
A central contrast in Kuhn's original work is the division between normal and revolutionary science. We may now 
understand this division as the distinction between research conducted in terms of an existing conceptual structure, 
without changing that structure, and research proceeding by modifying an existing conceptual structure ... (Barker et 
al. 2003, p. 232)
But  as  we  have  already  shown  (in  Section  4),  conceptual  change  as  such is  not  a  sufficient 
condition for a scientific revolution, since not all types of conceptual change lead to revolutions. As 
a result, Chen's and Barker's account is not capable of offering identification criteria of revolutions. 
Our concept can be fruitfully used for a further specification of conceptual changes presented by 
this  model.  For  example,  in  view  of  our  concept,  it  could  be  asked:  at  which  point  does  a 
conceptual  change  (presented  in  terms  of  this  model)  become revolutionary  (according  to  our 
identification criteria)? Which features need to be added to the model so that it can account for the 
distinction between scientific revolutions and other changes in scientific development?
6. Laudan's Conception of Scientific Revolutions
Laudan (1977) introduces the concept of research tradition to describe the evolution of scientific 
disciplines. The working definition which he proposes is:
A research tradition is a set of general assumptions about the entities and processes in a domain of study, and 
about the appropriate methods to be used for investigating the problems and constructing the theories in that 
domain. (1977, p. 81)
So research traditions are sets of ontological and methodological commitments. However, this set is 
not fixed. There is a gradual evolution:
There is much continuity in an evolving research tradition. From one stage to the next, there is preservation of 
most of the crucial assumptions of the research traditions. But the emphasis here must be on relative continuity 
between successive stages in the evolutionary process. If a research tradition has undergone numerous evolutions 
in the course of time, there will probably be many discrepancies between the methodology and the ontology of 
its earliest and its latest formulations. (1977, pp. 98-99; italics in original)
Each  successive  stage  of  a  research  tradition  is  a  certain  set  of  ontological,  axiological  and 
methodological guidelines. This can be illustrated by means of a fragment (from Apollonius over 
Hipparchus to Ptolemaeus) of the history of geocentric astronomy.
The ontology on which these three astronomers built their theories has two basic claims:
(GA) The Earth is located in a sphere (the Stellar Sphere) to which the fixed stars are attached.
(GB) Besides the Earth, the Stellar Sphere contains seven celestial bodies that are called planets 
(Greek for wanderers) because they  seem to move in an irregular way. These planets are: 
Moon, Sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter en Saturn.
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In the third century B.C, Apollonius developed a theory which could predict the motion of the stars 
and the planets by implementing the following guidelines:
(G1) The Earth is stationary: it does not participate in any locomotion.
(G2) The Earth is located at the centre of the Stellar Sphere.
(G3) The Stellar Sphere rotates at constant speed around the earth.
(G4) The motion of planets is epicyclic: they are located at the circumference of a circle (called 
the  epicycle) whose centre D also makes a circular motion around some centre (the latter 
circle is called the deferent).
(G5) The Earth is the centre of the deferents of all planets.
(G6) The two circular motions are uniform: the centres of the epicycles move at constant speed 
around the Earth, and the planets move at constant speed around the centre of their epicycle.
Implementation of these guidelines requires determining the values of the two radii and of the two 
angular speeds of motion. A good implementation of Apollonius' paradigm10 can explain retrograde 
motion and can account  for the fact  that  planets  appear  brighter  at  some times than at  others. 
However, there were some unsolvable problems, e.g. the fact that the Sun looks larger at noon in 
the (Greek/Northern) winter than in summer. This and other problems were solved in the second 
century B.C. by Hipparchus of Nicaea, who introduced eccentric motion. His paradigm contains the 
ontological claims GA and GB, and all laws except G5 and G6 are conserved. G5 is replaced by:
(G5 ') For each planet there is a point E, the  eccentric, which is the centre of its deferent. This 
centre is not necessarily the Earth.
The double uniformity idea of G6 is retained, but the formulation must be adapted as a consequence 
of the shift from G5 to G5'. The new formulation is:
(G6') The two circular motions are uniform: the centres of the epicycles move at constant speed 
around the eccentric E, and the planets move at constant speed around the centre of their 
epicycle.
To implement this new paradigm, we have to determine the values of the radii and the angular 
speed (as was the case with Apollonius). On top of that, we have to determine the positions (relative 
to the Earth) of the eccentrics of the different planets.
In the second century A.D., Claudius Ptolemaeus of Alexandria developed a device, the equant, 
for eliminating the remaining inaccuracies in the predictions of the theory of Hipparchus. He gave 
up G6' and replaced it with:
(G6'') (a) For each planet there is a point Q, the  equant, such that the angular speed of D (the 
centre of the epicycle) is constant with respect to Q. Q is not necessarily the eccentric E or 
the Earth.
(b) The planets move at constant speed around the centre of their epicycle.
Now let us see how Laudan defines scientific revolutions. He writes:
[A] scientific revolution occurs when a research tradition, hitherto unknown to, or ignored by, scientists in a 
given field, reaches a point of development where scientists in the field feel obliged to consider it seriously as a 
contender for the allegiance of themselves or their colleagues. (1977, p. 138)
This  definition  would  be  adequate  if  Laudan  had  a  clear  criterion  for  distinguishing  research 
traditions from one another. He does not have such a criterion. So Laudan's criterion does not say 
anything about what is going on in a revolution, and how we can recognize one when we see one. 
For instance, Copernicus used the same methods (deferents and epicycles) as the geocentrists. So 
14
why is this a new research tradition? Laudan does not give any answer. Our concept can be used to 
help answering this question. In view of it, we can say that Copernicus could not recuperate the 
auxiliary hypotheses of the geocentrists. He had to start all over again, had to build a completely 
new system.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a concept of scientific revolution based on its identification criteria. 
Such a concept is to be distinguished from approaches to conceptualising revolutions which aim at 
explaining  different  aspects  of  the  whole  process,  and  which  we  have  dubbed  as  explanatory 
concepts  of  revolution.  The aim of  this  paper  was  to  show not  only that  there  is  a  difference 
between these two approaches, but that the identification criteria of revolutions can be fruitfully 
used for a further elaboration of conceptions of the second type. On the one hand, we can use our 
concept to test the preciseness and accuracy of the explanatory conceptions, by examining to what 
extent  their  criteria  fit  revolutions  as  they are  defined by our  concept.  On the other  hand,  our 
concept can serve as the basis on which different approaches to conceptualising revolutions can be 
further specified. By presenting four different explanatory concepts of revolutions, we have pointed 
to the ways in which each of them could be further elaborated in view of our concept.11
Notes
1.  Note that this is also the limit of our analogy: the identification criteria are not the same as 
symptoms.   The   notion   of   symptom   is   both   broader   and   narrower   than   the   notion   of   an 
identification   criterion:   broader   since   symptoms   are   not   always   sufficient   for   a   clear 
identification of a phenomenon, and narrower since, in contrast to identification criteria, one and 
the  same set  of  symptoms might  not  be applicable   to all   the  instances  of  a  whole  class  of 
phenomena.
2. In order to make it easier to follow which of these two approaches we are referring to, we will 
call the first type “explanatory concepts of revolutions”.
3. All citations of TSSR will be given according the the 3rd edition from 1996.
4. Kuhn's notion of world should not be confused with a realist concept of the mind­independent 
world. For a detailed discussion on this concept in Kuhn's work see Hoyningen­Huene 1993, 
Section 6.2, as well as Šešelja et al. forthcoming, Section 4.
5. Hoyningen­Huene remarks that ‘this step doesn't extend the meaning of the noun '(scientific) 
revolution' but only of the adjective 'revolutionary'. For while, in his writings, Kuhn qualifies 
discoveries in the appropriate class as 'revolutionary', he usually doesn't call them revolutions’ 
(Hoyningen­Huene 1993, p. 1998). Nevertheless, it would be farfetched to say that Kuhn had a 
clear view on the distinction between “scientific revolution” and “revolutionary change” or that 
he coherently applied it in TSSR (see, e.g., Kuhn 1962, p. 92­93 where he explicitly mentions 
discovery of X­rays as an example of a scientific revolution in the extended sense of the term). 
We   will   thus   keep   on   using   these   two   terms   (“revolution”   and   “revolutionary   change”) 
interchangeably.
6. Note that Kuhn's point is not that revolutionary changes do not consist of piece­meal changes, but 
that during such stages scientific theories are necessarily incoherent, and that ‘only the initial 
and final sets of generalizations provide a coherent account of nature’ (Kuhn 1987, p. 29).
7. Beside the mentioned criteria, Kuhn adds that his taxonomic approach points to the fact that 
revolutions should be compared with “speciation”: ‘After a revolution there are usually (perhaps 
always) more cognitive specialties or fields of knowledge than there were before.’ (Kuhn 1991, p. 
97; also cp. Kuhn 1993, p. 250­251).
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8.   Note   that   even  Kuhn   himself  weakened   the   idea   of   crisis   as   a   necessary   prerequisite   to 
revolutions:  even  though,  according to his  conception,  a   revolution  is  usually  preceded by a 
crisis, ‘Revolutions may also be induced in other ways, though I think they seldom are.’ (Kuhn 
1962, p. 181; cp. also Hoyningen­Huene 1993, p. 232­233). In so far, Wray's criteria are not the 
most accurate representation of Kuhn's thought.
9.  This  property  of   revolutions  has  been  modified   in  Kuhn's   later  articles  where  he speaks  of 
revolutionary changes as holistic rather than discontinuous (cp. Note 5).
10. The term “paradigm” is used here to denote a stage of a research tradition.
11. Our concept also makes it possible to investigate the relation between revolutions and creativity 
and the relations between revolutions and rationality. See Weber 1999 for this.
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